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12 Renewable Energy under the Kyoto Protocol: The Case for 
Mixing Instruments 
______________________________________________________________ 
DAVID M. DRIESEN 
 
 
This paper argues that effective climate policy may require a mixture of policy 
mechanisms to encourage technological development necessary to facilitate an eventual 
fossil fuel phase out. This idea contrasts with the view that broad global environmental 
benefit trading1 offers a climate change panacea. The trading as panacea view suggests 
that the Kyoto Protocol’s trading mechanisms assure adequate attention to renewable 
energy and that neither trading design nor technology policy measures are important as 
long as a broad and wide carbon market exists. This paper explains why this view is 
mistaken and puts forward the idea of taxing fossil fuels in order to pay for the 
introduction of more renewable energy, the use of other targeted programs to encourage 
renewable energy, and trading design principles to encourage technological progress. 
 This paper begins with an explanation of why renewable energy is important to 
efforts to address global climate change. The paper’s second part presents data showing 
that global environmental benefit trading has not encouraged renewable energy as well as 
more targeted programs. This part of the paper also briefly presents some of the 
theoretical reasons to expect global trading to perform suboptimally in encouraging 
renewable energy. 
 The paper’s final part discusses policy implications. It argues that the proper goal 
of policy should be to move toward an eventual phase-out of fossil fuels, rather than 
maximizing short-term cost minimization. It suggests a mix of policy tools and emissions 
trading design principles that can help move us toward this goal. 
 
1. Renewable Energy’s Importance in Addressing Global Climate Change 
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Practically all climate change experts recognize that meaningfully addressing climate 
change will require fundamental changes in the production and use of energy. Predictions 
of the amount of carbon reductions needed to avoid dangerous climate change tend to 
coalesce at around a 50 per cent global reduction by 2050, followed by even more drastic 
cuts.2 Because developed countries like Canada have better technological capabilities 
than developing countries and bear historical responsibility for most of the problem, 
developed countries will need to produce substantially more than a 50 per cent reduction 
in national carbon emissions to make a worldwide cut of that magnitude possible. Since 
carbon dioxide, a product of fossil fuel combustion, accounts for about 80 per cent of the 
global warming potential of world greenhouse gas emissions, the overwhelming majority 
of these cuts must come from drastic reductions in the amount of fossil fuel burned.3 
Achieving anything less than this creates a high probability of very serious consequences, 
such as melting polar ice caps, the inundation of much of Bangladesh, and widespread 
drought in Africa.4 Seen in this light, a successful climate change program will deliver 
large short-term reductions in a manner that sets the stage for making more serious cuts 
in the future. 
 The economics of energy suggest that strategies employed now to reduce carbon 
emissions must contribute to lowering the price and increasing the utility of renewable 
energy in order to make more drastic future cuts feasible. Economists frequently use top-
down approaches to modelling the costs of addressing climate change, relying on basic 
macroeconomic data about the effects of previous rises in energy costs.5 This approach, 
which implicitly assumes that our technological capabilities today resemble those of the 
1970s, sometimes generates numbers so high that they raise serious questions about 
whether the world’s governments would ever agree to make the reductions needed to 
avoid dangerous climate change.6 Yet, some bottom-up models, which consider current 
technologies available to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,7 predict that the drastic cuts 
scientists call for can be achieved at zero net cost, meaning no more cost than continuing 
with business as usual would generate.8 They arrive at this conclusion by assuming that 
the continued refinement of existing technologies will generate cost savings in energy 
technology comparable to what we have seen in the past, especially for renewable 
energy.9 This suggests that policies must support the deployment of renewable energy in 
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the near term in order to make avoiding dangerous climate change feasible. Deployment 
of renewables creates ‘learning by doing,’ which will enable renewable energy providers 
to improve the utility and lower the cost of their products.10  
 Renewable energy has enormous advantages over competing forms of energy, 
when viewed from a long-term perspective. Some forms of renewable energy, such as 
solar, have zero fuel costs.11 This implies that even with large initial capital investment, if 
the technology is durable, then the non-discounted long-term costs should be low. And 
renewable energy offers zero direct carbon emissions while simultaneously delivering 
significant reductions in particulate and ground-level ozone, which constitute serious 
health hazards in Canada and in many other places around the world. Furthermore, a 
transition to renewable energy promises to ameliorate acid rain and the ecological 
damage associated with burning fossil fuels. Thus, renewable energy would be 
worthwhile, even if it costs a lot more than ‘end-of-the-pipe’ approaches to greenhouse 
gas reductions because it simultaneously offers a host of incidental environmental 
benefits. 
 The history of renewable energy suggests that its employment will cost much less 
in the future than it does today, if appropriate policies support its development. We have 
seen large decreases in the cost of all forms of renewable energy as manufacturers learn 
how to more efficiently deploy renewable energy with increased production 
opportunities.12 Indeed, wind power has become competitive with fossil fuels as a source 
of peak generating power. Generally, progress has been most dramatic in countries and 
regions with supportive policies.13 It is reasonable to assume that with appropriate 
policies, costs can continue to fall.  
 By contrast, continued reliance on fossil fuels presents grave risks to the economy 
and our security, not just to the environment. Since fossil fuels are finite resources, their 
price will eventually rise and then they will run out. If we fail to implement policies that 
will stimulate development, refinement, and deployment of alternative technologies, 
these price increases and shortages will likely prove very disruptive.  
 To put it another way, we will stop using oil and coal as energy sources sooner or 
later, because they will cease to exist. The only question is whether we switch to 
alternatives before or after we commit the atmosphere to very dangerous global warming. 
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It would seem prudent to begin the switch as soon as possible in light of the long 
residence times of greenhouse gases. Once emitted, these gases remain in the atmosphere 
trapping heat for a century or more, so that we cannot subsequently adjust to failures to 
make sufficiently ambitious cuts early on.  
 In emphasizing renewable energy’s importance, I do not mean to deny the 
relevance of other technological options. Indeed, cogent analysis of how to avoid 
dangerous climate changes envisions a mixture of technologies and strategies, as 
renewables may not solve the climate change problem alone.14 Improved energy 
efficiency is an important part of making renewables, which are difficult to introduce at a 
large scale, more viable. But many other technological options have significant 
drawbacks that make renewable energy relatively attractive. Nuclear power poses the risk 
of accidents and creates security and waste disposal issues. Carbon sequestration may 
have potential, at least for addressing part of the problem, but it leaves many 
environmental problems associated with burning coal unaddressed and may not provide a 
long-term solution to climate change.15 Advances in renewable energy then are important 
to our future and sustainable development, even though they are not the sole means we 
have of addressing climate change. 
 
2. Trading, Targeted Incentives, and Renewable Energy 
 
The literature on trading suggests that it encourages innovation, which might lead one to 
suspect that the trading of carbon credits will stimulate large increases in the production 
of renewable energy. So far, trading does not seem to have done so. China and India add 
significant amounts of coal powered-generating capacity to their power grids every 
year.16 One might object that this does not represent a failure of trading, but rather the 
lack of caps on those countries. But that is precisely the point. Cap-and-trade programs’ 
environmental improvements come from the caps, not from the trading. The trading 
simply provides a means of lowering the cost of meeting the environmentally valuable 
carbon reductions required by setting strict caps. Cap-and-trade programs must demand 
large carbon reductions from very significant sectors of the economy in order to provide a 
meaningful impetus for carbon reduction.  
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 At first glance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Kyoto Protocol’s 
trading program allowing developing countries to provide emission reduction credits to 
offset emissions in the developed world, seems to provide a countervailing force. The 
majority of CDM projects involve renewable energy. But a more careful analysis makes 
the countervailing force vanish. One should evaluate CDM distribution by carbon credits, 
because this gives a picture of how much of the greenhouse gas reductions being 
provided come from renewable energy. An evaluation of the distribution of carbon 
credits reveals that renewable energy has provided approximately 17 per cent of the total 
credits, and energy efficiency, which is vital to renewable energy’s long-term prospects, 
constitutes a paltry 10 per cent.17 End-of-the-pipe control, as figure 12.1 shows, generates 
the lion’s share of the credits. 
 
[Figure 12.1 to go about here, top of page] 
 
The main reason that trading encourages end-of-the-pipe controls is that the market 
favours the cheapest means of meeting greenhouse gas reductions. End-of-the-pipe 
projects controlling emissions of potent greenhouse gases, such as HFC 23, cost less than 
most renewable energy projects on a dollar per carbon dioxide equivalent basis.18 The 
data available so far reflect only the experience with the reductions encouraged by Phase 
I of the European Union’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) and the newly proposed 
stricter targets in Phase II. The limits imposed on pollution sources create demand for 
credits, making the ETS the primary driver of private sector purchases. One would expect 
the role of renewable energy to increase somewhat as targets become stricter, as they will 
in phase two of this two-part scheme.  
 However, competition among CDM projects will tend to encourage the cheapest 
emissions reductions. This means that the market does not systematically account for 
renewable energy’s long-term and non-carbon advantages, that is, its capacity to 
contribute to long-term technological advances and its ability to limit conventional air 
pollution. Emissions trading markets are better vehicles for seizing low hanging fruit than 
for planting new fruit trees. Trading’s maximization of short-term cost effectiveness 
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conflicts with the goal of maximizing technological progress, collateral benefits from 
carbon motivated technological changes, and even long-term cost effectiveness.19  
 While the suggestion that trading does not optimally encourage valuable 
innovation may appear novel, it enjoys increasing support in the economics literature.20 
Furthermore, the most careful students of the acid rain trading program’s technological 
impact have concluded that it encouraged innovation less effectively than the traditional 
performance standards that preceded it.21
 By contrast with trading, more targeted energy policies have increased 
deployment of renewable energy significantly, creating a huge increase in wind 
generating capacity and more modest increases in deployment of other alternative energy 
sources.22 Fiscal incentives have played a key role in encouraging these advances, but 
some quantity mechanisms have also played an important role. The most successful fiscal 
incentive appears to be the ‘feed-in tariff,’ which is widely used in Europe.23 Countries 
employing feed-in tariffs require electricity producers to pay a fixed above-market price 
for all alternative energy produced. Countries experiencing the greatest growth in wind 
power have employed this system.24 Many regions of the world employ renewable 
portfolio standards to encourage renewable energy, rather than feed-in tariffs. These 
programs require the purchase of a fixed quantity of renewable energy. Recently, these 
programs have taken the form of ‘renewable certificate’ programs, which allow trades of 
certificates representing renewable energy generation. While these limited trading 
programs offer some advantages in tracking compliance with renewable portfolio 
standards, it is not clear that the extra flexibility they provide is vital to achieving 
program goals.25 Targeted measures aimed at supporting renewable energy, unlike broad 
global trading, have played a major role in encouraging the increases in production and 
decreases in price that we have seen in the renewable energy sector.  
 Trading programs and targeted incentives for renewables clash philosophically. A 
philosophy of market liberalism undergirds trading programs. Devotees of these 
programs want to limit governments’ role to goal setting and leave technological choices 
to the free market.26 By contrast, renewable programs stem from government decisions to 
favour a particular class of technologies. Governments around the world have decided 
that sustainable development goals – including energy security, long-term economic 
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development, protection of the health of current generations from routine air pollution, 
and the creation of local employment – all favour renewable energy. From the standpoint 
of market liberalism such decisions smack of unjustified interference in the free market 
of emissions trading. One frequently hears the mantra, ‘Let the market decide.’ This 
slogan seems to reflect the notion that the only legitimate goal involved in choosing 
future energy technology is the short-term reduction of carbon at the lowest possible cost. 
 The analysis offered above, however, suggests that the market, even markets that 
have internalized some environmental costs associated with current carbon dioxide 
emissions, do not offer proper incentives for the long-term changes needed to address 
global warming and the economic well-being of future generations. Economists 
recognize that markets tend to under-invest in technological innovation. Those who 
advance technological development create positive economic spillovers – that is, benefits 
that do not generate revenues for the firm bearing the cost of technological 
development.27 For example, an advance in the design of photovoltaic cells that may 
make them cheaper or more useful in cloudy climates may gain some additional revenue 
for the person making the advance. But if another firm looks at the design of these cells 
and uses the information gleaned from this examination to further advance the state of the 
art, the second firm, not the first, may gather the revenue. The contribution of the first 
firm’s technology to the second technological advance constitutes a positive spillover 
from the first firm’s investment. Companies can be reluctant to make investments that 
will substantially benefit competing firms. Furthermore, investments in new technologies 
are inherently risky and their benefits are difficult to predict.28 This can make firms, 
especially firms that control lucrative conventional technologies, reluctant to invest in 
innovation, which is a major driver of economic prosperity. The collateral benefits of 
reduced conventional air pollution also constitute a positive spillover that carbon markets 
do not encourage firms to internalize. This means that even with optimal carbon targets, 
an emissions trading program does not provide optimal incentives for broadly rational 
technological choices unless supplemented with some corrective mechanism. This 
suggests that governments should supplement carbon markets with more targeted 
measures aimed at advancing technology. 
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3. A Mix of Policies 
 
Instrument selection reflects implicit normative choices. For the most part, writers 
assume that the norm of minimizing the short-term cost of meeting a given carbon 
reduction goal should govern instrument selection, and therefore use a short efficiency 
criterion to guide instrument choice. In the climate change context, however, society 
should instead choose a goal of pushing the price differential between renewables and 
fossil fuels to a tipping point where renewable energy becomes the more economic 
option. This goal commends itself because of the significant costs associated with failing 
to avoid dangerous climate change.29 If one wants to avoid those costs, then maximizing 
long-term technological change is more important than minimizing short-term costs. 
While we can expect some movement in this direction to occur through scarcity-induced 
increases in fossil fuel prices, this price-induced change will not move the world toward 
the drastic cuts we need to meaningfully address global warming in a timely manner. The 
question is: What can be done to make this change happen? 
 
3.1. New Economic Incentive Programs 
 
The goal of encouraging a shift from fossil fuels to renewables suggests that we should 
tax fossil fuels to fund renewable energy. Mikael Skou Andersen has pointed out that 
systems that employ this kind of approach, employing a negative economic incentive to 
fund a positive economic incentive, can effectively encourage innovation.30 This 
approach sends a signal that private actors should invest in alternatives to fossil fuels, 
instead of building new coal-fired plants with years of useful life ahead of them that 
pump large amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. 
 This proposal also helps rectify the problem of fossil fuel subsidies artificially 
delaying the introduction of renewable energy by making fossil fuels too cheap relative to 
renewable energy.31 Of course, that observation leads to the question, why not simply 
abolish fossil fuel subsidies? Abolishing fossil fuel subsidies would be a good idea, 
although we probably need to increase positive incentives for renewable energy as well.32 
But eliminating long established subsidies from tax codes and government budgets may 
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prove even more politically difficult than enacting a bold new program to shift the 
incentives in the right direction. 
 China provides an example of deliberate government use of tax incentives to meet 
sustainable development goals. China has taxed CDM projects differentially, imposing 
high taxes on projects generating carbon credits through end-of-the-pipe controls of 
industrial gases while imposing low taxes on renewable energy.33 Furthermore, China 
has announced an intention to fund renewable energy.34 It is at least possible that some of 
the funds for the renewables will come from taxes on less desirable CDM projects. China, 
then, has created incentives that favour renewable energy, which makes sense for the 
climate and economic development. It would be even better policy to tax the generation 
of carbon, rather than carbon reductions, to fund renewable energy. 
 An Environmental Competition Statute, which also funds positive economic 
incentives with negative economic incentives, has the potential to avoid many of the 
governmental weaknesses that tend to interfere with the achievement of ambitious goals, 
like those needed to address global warming. Such a statute would simply authorize any 
entity lowering its carbon dioxide emissions to recoup the costs incurred in reducing its 
carbon output from a competitor of its choosing that has higher emissions, along with a 
pre-set premium.35 It allows the capacity of the most environmentally progressive entities 
in an industry to establish benchmarks that other companies must adhere to if they wish 
to avoid paying competitors. It thus encourages a race to maximize environmental 
performance, comparable to the race to improve product quality that can occur because of 
market share concerns in highly competitive markets.  
 This approach helps avoid a problem with emissions trading and pollution taxes; 
namely, their dependence on tough government decision-making. Trading can only work 
when government officials set ambitious caps. Similarly, pollution taxes only provide 
significant reduction incentives if officials set reasonably high tax rates. The 
Environmental Competition Statute allows the capabilities of the most environmentally 
capable companies to drive programmatic achievements, relying on the government only 
to set up a law requiring these sorts of payments and establishing the profit margin that 
companies besting their competitors will be awarded through the premium. In this 
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approach the limited bravery of government officials in setting caps or tax rates does not 
limit the programs’ achievements. 
 
3.2. Sectoral Programs 
 
Countries can expand and strengthen the sectoral programs that have proven more 
successful than trading in stimulating renewables, such as renewable portfolio standards 
and feed-in tariffs. These programs can include demand-side management programs for 
electric utilities and energy efficiency standards for appliances and vehicles.36
 
3.3. Trading Design 
 
While an environmental benefit trading program offers a suboptimal tool for stimulating 
relatively expensive renewable energy, renewable energy can play a role in such 
programs. A country can maximize that role by attending to the following design 
principles if it employs environmental benefit or emissions trading. 
 
STRICT CAPS 
Ambitious caps requiring large emission reductions will raise the cost of compliance 
sufficiently to make some renewable energy viable. While those purchasing credits will 
still prefer to avoid relatively expensive renewables in favour of lower cost conventional 
options, they may find some purchase of renewable credits unavoidable if they must 
purchase large volumes of credits in order to comply. And, of course, strict caps 
ameliorate climate change more effectively than lax caps, simply because they lower the 
amount of carbon warming the earth.  
 
LIMITED OFFSETS 
A country that wishes to make sure that its credit purchases make a long-term 
contribution to sustainable development can limit the classes of projects eligible for offset 
credits and the amount of offsets that are allowed. Indeed, a country could accept only 
renewable energy projects as offsets, thereby ruling out projects that contribute little to 
 10
the long-term process of technological development to facilitate fossil fuel replacement.37 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a program to limit utility emissions in the 
northeastern states, provides quantitative and qualitative limits on offsets in order to 
protect the program’s environmental integrity.38
 
LIMITED BREADTH 
Large linked markets will tend to maximize cost savings, thereby dropping the cost of 
credits.39 These cost drops reduce incentives for expensive innovation. This point is 
consistent with economic models of taxes, which link higher tax rates to greater 
innovation rates. Narrower programs stimulate valuable high-cost innovation better than 
broad ones, by limiting the availability of cheap conventional credits. 
 
INPUT ALLOWANCES 
A program limiting the total amount of fossil fuel consumed through tradable allowances 
in dirty inputs (such as coal and oil) will better encourage innovation than a broad 
program focused on end-of-the pipe allowances.40 It will also prove much easier to 
monitor and enforce. Such a program can reach the transport sector, which has been left 
out of caps enacted so far, thereby allowing for a comprehensive economy-wide cap. 
Some of the bills pending in the United States Congress use a variant on this idea to 
create an economy-wide cap.41
 
4. Conclusion 
 
A tension exists between maximizing short-term cost effectiveness and maximizing long-
term investments needed to address global warming. We can creatively employ a mixture 
of policy tools to maximize incentives to shift away from fossil fuels to cleaner 
approaches.  
 
 
Notes 
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